Our blue-teaming methods come out of published, peer-visible research — not a proprietary black box. Each technique below is backed by a paper you can read.
01
Boundary-informed defense
You cannot ship a defense that provably cannot hold. The Defense Trilemma establishes the boundary where prompt-injection wrapper defenses must fail — continuity, utility preservation, and complete safety cannot coexist. We build to the boundary, not past it, so a control does not fail silently in production.
Read the paper: The Defense Trilemma →02
Tool & protocol hardening
Agentic systems are only as safe as the tools they call. ETDI hardens the Model Context Protocol against tool squatting and rug-pull attacks with OAuth-enhanced tool signatures and policy-based access control, so a malicious or mutated tool cannot be silently substituted into an agent's workflow.
Read the paper: ETDI →03
Positive-security guardrails
Detecting every bad input is impossible; allowing only the right input is tractable. QFIRE is an inline prompt firewall for healthcare AI agents that combines positive-security scope constraints with an asynchronous detector graph — 0.83 recall where generic injection classifiers reach only 0.40.
Read the paper: QFIRE →04
Provenance & audit artifacts
An agent's actions must be reconstructable after the fact. MAIF embeds provenance, access control, and audit evidence into the data objects agents use, so each artifact carries the signed chain of who touched it, what it was allowed to do, and where it came from.
Read the paper: MAIF →