[ service // adversarial_verification ]

AI Red Teaming

Most AI red teaming produces anecdotes: a jailbreak screenshot, a cherry-picked failure, a score on a benchmark the model may have seen. We do the other kind — systematic adversarial testing that maps where a system fails, how often, and under what conditions, with evidence a third party can re-run.

Principles / 004
  • Evidence over anecdotes — every finding ships with a reproducible trace.
  • Negative results count — a defense that cannot hold is a result, not an embarrassment.
  • Benchmarks are necessary, not sufficient — a passing score is not a capability claim.
  • Independent by construction — we test other people's claims, not our own marketing.
[ methods // from_our_research ]

How we attack

Our red teaming methods come out of published, peer-visible research — not a proprietary black box. Each technique below is backed by a paper you can read.

01

Adversarial exploration

Static benchmarks saturate and get gamed. Our Go-Explore work treats red teaming as exploration: agents systematically search the space of attack strategies, map where models fail, and surface weaknesses that fixed test suites never reach.

Read the paper: Go-Explore Red Teaming →
02

Failure cartography

Failures are not random noise — they form structured basins. Our Manifold of Failure research maps the geometry of where language models break, so testing targets the regions where failures cluster instead of sampling blindly.

Read the paper: Manifold of Failure →
03

Agentic attack frameworks

Agentic systems fail differently from chat models. LAAF is an open framework for red teaming LLM agents — multi-step attacks, tool misuse, and cross-agent manipulation — built so results are reproducible, not anecdotal.

Read the paper: LAAF →
[ case_study ]

Verified in the field

Our adversarial verification of a production AI integration — the OpenAI–Hugging Face inference deployment — is documented stage by stage: what was verified before deployment, what was recorded during operation, and what the evidence supported when behavior deviated. It is the same loop we bring to every engagement.

[ engage ]

Have a system worth attacking?

We take on a small number of adversarial verification engagements — models, agentic systems, and the infrastructure they run on. Tell us what claim you need tested.

Request a project →